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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAM JOY REALTY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
5900 Associates, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability 
company, and John Does 1-10, 
unknown individuals, 
Defendants and Appellees 
Case No. 940662-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, plaintiff and appellant Pam Joy Realty replies to those 
new matters raised by defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates, 
regarding plaintiff's evidence of fraud and mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF PRODUCING 
EVIDENCE IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE. 
In its motion for summary judgment and subsequent brief on 
appeal, the defendant seeks to demonstrate that the plaintiff's 
evidence is legally insufficient to establish its claims of fraud 
and mistake as a matter of law. Brief of Appellee at 10-26. 
Defendant attempts to support this contention by attacking both the 
nature and sufficiency of the statements contained in plaintiff's 
counter-affidavit, and by requiring plaintiff to meet its "burden 
of proof" by establishing its case at this stage of the proceedings 
by clear and convincing evidence. Brief of Appellee at 24-25. 
In support of the latter position, defendant relies primarily 
on this Court's decision in Andalex Resources. Inc. v. Myers. 871 
P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994). Brief of Appellee at 14. In Andalex, 
this Court essentially followed the federal approach to summary 
judgment proceedings which requires trial judges to consider the 
eventual standard of proof at trial before ruling these motions. 
Id. at 1046-47. See, e.g. . All West Pet Supply v. Hill's Pet 
Products, 840 F. Supp. 1426, 1431-33, (D. Kan. 1993)(discussion of 
different state and federal standards). This approach was also 
taken in Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 
(Utah App. 1994), which, however, held that the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment against the plaintiff and appellant on 
its fraud claim. 883 P.2d at 293. 
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According to this view, it is not enough for the nonmoving 
party to establish the mere existence of genuine issues of material 
fact by producing some evidence supporting each element of its 
claim. See, e.g. , Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 
(Utah App. 1994). Rather, the nonmoving party has the additional 
burden of providing sufficient evidence which, if assumed to be 
true, would establish a prima facie case according to the standard 
of proof applicable to a particular claim at trial, id. As 
succinctly stated in Republic: 
In order to grant summary judgment on this 
claim, the trial court had to determine that 
Republic failed to supply evidence which, if 
accepted as true, would clearly and 
convincingly support each element of a fraud 
claim. 
883 P.2d at 292. 
By contrast, it appears that the Utah Supreme Court continues 
to adhere to the traditional view. For example, in Ron Shepherd 
Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994), the Court 
stated: 
"Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce 
the pleadings to determine whether a material 
issue of fact exists that must be resolved by 
the fact finder." Lamb v. B & B Amusements 
Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (citing 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 
692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984); Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)). In 
accordance with this rule, "[t]he party moving 
for summary judgment must establish a right to 
judgment based on the applicable law as 
applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact. A party opposing the motion is required 
only to show that there is a material issue of 
fact." Id. (emphasis added)(citations 
omitted). Moreover, as to questions 
concerning material issues of fact, 
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" [a]ffidavits and depositions submitted in 
support of and in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment may be used only to determine 
whether a material issue of fact exists, not 
to determine whether one party's case is less 
persuasive than another's or is not likely to 
succeed in a trial on the merits." Id. 
Accordingly, M[b]ecause this is an appeal from 
a summary judgment, we review the factual 
submissions to the trial court in a light most 
favorable to finding a material issue of 
fact." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat' 1 Cos., 842 
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) (citing King v. 
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 
(Utah 1992)). "A genuine issue of fact exists 
where, on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could differ" on any 
material issue. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 
613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
Id. at 654-55 
In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, a case involving the 
clear and convincing evidence standard, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), 
the Court observed that: 
In granting summary judgment, it is 
apparent that the trial court gave more weight 
to some affidavits than to others. This was 
inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. 
On a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and 
its sole inquiry should be whether material 
issues of fact exist. W.M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Nat'l Resources Co., 627 P. 2d 56, 59 
(Utah 1981). 
Id. at 1100. 
In this case, defendant moved for summary judgment before 
filing an answer or engaging in any discovery. It now attempts to 
demonstrate that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof 
by improperly weighing the evidence. In Appellee's brief, for 
example, the following assertion is made: 
4 
This is not a case of which party can be 
most persuasive in convincing a fact finder 
whether a mistake was or was not made. It is 
a case of meeting one's burden of proof. It 
is a case of whether plaintiff — as a matter 
of law — can establish that its case is so 
clear that there could be no substantial 
doubt. It is defendant's position, in light 
of the affirmative affidavit of Briggs; the 
existence of two written contracts; the clear 
and unambiguous language of the contracts; the 
second opportunity of plaintiff to correct any 
mistake; the lack of materiality and/or 
prejudice; and the vagueness, as well as the 
hearsay nature of plaintiff's opposing 
affidavit, that reasonable minds could simply 
never conclude that plaintiff's position is so 
clear and convincing that it is without doubt 
as to its correctness. 
Brief of Appellee at 24-25. Such an approach literally leads to a 
trial by affidavit in contravention of the purpose and intent of 
summary judgment proceedings. See Draper City. 888 P.2d at 1100. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF FRAUD IS LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT . 
Plaintiff and defendant agree that under Utah law, the well 
established elements of fraud are: 
(1) A representation; 
(2) Of a presently existing fact; 
(3) Which was false; 
(4) Which the representor either knew to be false or 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge on which to base such representation; 
(5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
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(6) And the other party acted reasonably; 
(7) And did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) And was damaged. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Defendant 
contends, however, that sufficient evidence of elements (2), (4), 
(6), and (9) is lacking. Plaintiff contends that it has met its 
burden of producing legally sufficient evidence on each element to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment. 
A. Evidence of Representation of Presently Existing Facts. 
In it's brief on appeal, plaintiff identified seven specific 
misrepresentations of material facts by defendant's agent Barlow 
Briggs. Brief of Appellant at 19-20. Defendant elected to respond 
to only two of them. Brief of Appellee at 11-14. 
1. Re-roofing Issue 
The first issue involves disputed facts about the extent of 
the work on the roof. Plaintiff contends that it was told the 
entire building had been re-roofed. Smalley Aff. 1 6. Defendant 
claims it represented only that "extensive repairs" had been made. 
Briggs Aff. f 7. 
According to plaintiff's evidence, Briggs told Smalley that 
the building had been completely re-roofed, that a five year 
warranty had been issued on the (new) roof, that Briggs was in 
possession of the warranty, and that he intended to include it in 
the sale. Brief of Appellant at 19-20. Thus, plaintiff understood 
that it was buying a building with a new roof under existing 
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warranty for any damage that might occur within a five year term. 
These representations clearly involve presently existing 
facts, since the work on the roof was represented as having been 
completed in the recent past. Smalley Aff. 5 4. The evidence is 
material, since there is a significant economic difference between 
a building with a new roof under warranty and a building with a 
merely repaired roof not under warranty. Such evidence when 
accepted as true for purposes of appellate review, satisfies 
plaintiff's burden of producing evidence under either standard of 
proof. 
Defendant attempts to meet this difficulty by attacking the 
evidentiary sufficiency of plaintiff's counter-affidavit for the 
first time on appeal. Brief of Appellee at 12-13. According to 
accepted principles of appellate review, however, defendant's 
failure to move to strike plaintiff's counter-affidavit or to 
object at oral argument on its motion for summary judgment results 
in a waiver of the right to object on evidentiary grounds now. 
Litster v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 936 n. 2 
(Utah App. 1994). Thus plaintiff's evidence must be accepted as 
true on appeal and plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom. Id.; GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 
P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. Future Performance Issue. 
Defendant continues to assert that: 
Utah case authority clearly holds that 
misrepresentation of intended future 
performance is not a "presently existing fact" 
upon which a claim for fraud can be based. 
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Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 247 U.A.R. 
31 (Sept. 1994); Andalex Resources v. Myers, 
871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994). 
Brief of Appellee at 12. 
Unfortunately, defendant neglects to mention the rest of the 
rule. A complete statement of the rule is as follows: 
A misrepresentation of intended future 
performance is not a "presently existing fact" 
upon which a claim for fraud can be based 
unless a plaintiff can prove that the 
representor, at the time of the 
representation, did not intend to perform the 
promise and made the representation for the 
purpose of deceiving the promisee. 
Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d at 1047 (emphasis added). 
Accord Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
In this case, plaintiff intends to prove that defendant's 
agent, at the time the representation was made, did not intend to 
perform the promise and made the representation for the purpose of 
deceiving Pam Joy. Since this evidence bears on the element of 
scienter, it will be discussed under that point below. 
B. Evidence of Intent to Deceive. 
Plaintiff produced the following evidence of defendant's 
intent to deceive by counter-affidavit: 
4. In connection with Pam Joy's 
negotiations to purchase the Property, I had 
several conversations with Briggs about Pam 
Joy's need to receive a standard commercial 
five-year warranty for the roof of the 
building (the "building") on the Property. 
The Warranty would cover both labor and 
materials and would exclude only damage caused 
by the owner or his agents, and any damage 
resulting from mechanical or heating / air 
conditioning or ventilation systems operation 
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or malfunction (the "Warranty"). Briggs as 
the representative for 5900 Associates, told 
me that 5900 Associates had such a Warranty as 
a result of having recently re-roofed the 
entire Building. Briggs promised to 
immediately provide me with the Warranty. 
5. In addition, on at least one 
occasion I made a request in writing for the 
Warranty for the roof of the Building. A true 
and correct copy of this writing dated April 
22, 1993 is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
5900 Associates responded in writing on april 
28, 1993 that the request was "acceptable". A 
true and correct copy of that response is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
6. On several occasions Briggs 
represented to me that the roof of the 
Building had been completely re-roofed by 
Layton Roofing and that Layton had given 5900 
Associates a Warranty for the roof for a 
period of five years as part of its roofing 
contract. 
7. Briggs further stated to me that the 
Warranty would be assigned to Pam Joy in 
connection with the Pam Joy's purchase of the 
Property. 
8. All of these representations by 
Briggs took place prior to the sale of the 
Property. As representative for Pam Joy, I 
and Pam Joy relied upon Briggs' 
representations that the Warranty would be 
delivered. I would not have proceeded to 
close the purchase of the Property without 
Briggs' representations that the Warranty 
would be delivered to Pam Joy. 
9. In reliance upon Briggs' 
representation that the Warranty would be 
assigned to Pam Joy as part of its purchase of 
the Property, Pam Joy proceeded to close its 
purchase of the Property on or about June 28, 
1993. 
10. The Warranty was not delivered at 
the closing of the sale of the Property. 
Smalley Aff., 55 4-10 (emphasis added). 
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By contrast, defendant's affidavit contains the following 
statements: 
1. 5900 Associates, L.C. is a duly 
organized limited liability company. Affiant 
is, and during all material times herein, was 
the manager of this company. 
2. Prior to June 30, 1993, 5900 
Associates, L.C. owned an office building in 
Murray, Utah located at 201 East 5900 South 
Street. 
3. On June 30, 1993, the office 
building was sold to Pam Joy Realty. Affiant 
understood Pam Joy to be a California 
corporation. 
4. From the standpoint of the seller, 
affiant handled all of the negotiations for 
the sale. No other owner of 5900 Associates, 
L.C. participated in any sales negotiating. 
7. Prior to June of 1993, Lay ton 
Roofing Company had made extensive roof 
repairs to the building. This information was 
disclosed to buyer's agents along with 
numerous other unrelated verbal discussions. 
Affiant at one time told buyer's agent that he 
thought a roof warranty could be obtained from 
Layton Roofing, although this was never an 
item that was followed up or incorporated into 
the sales agreement, and it was never 
affiant's intention to have this as a 
condition of the sales contract. Affiant 
thereafter had detailed discussions with Alan 
Smalley and Steven Sorenson, agents of the 
plaintiff, about repairs and warranty items 
and such discussions culminated in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3 of the final contract. 
Briggs Aff. 55 1-4, 7 (emphasis added). 
According to plaintiff's evidence, Briggs unequivocally 
represented to Smalley that an existing roof warranty "would be 
assigned to Pam Joy in connection with the Pam Joy's purchase of 
the property." Smalley Aff. 5 7. But, Briggs himself states that 
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he never intended to include a roof warranty as a condition of the 
sales contract. Briggs Aff. fl 7. Finally, it is uncontroverted 
that no warranty was ever delivered. 
Thus, assuming plaintiff's evidence to be truef it may be 
inferred that a representation was made which the promisor at the 
time (or at any time) did not intend to perform. Furthermore, 
since the warranty did not even exist, and Briggs was in a superior 
position to know that, it may also be inferred that the 
representation was made for the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff 
promisee, or at least made recklessly without sufficient knowledge 
to justify it. See Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
When, as here, extrinsic evidence of a party's intent is 
disputed, then a material fact is also disputed and summary 
judgment cannot be granted. Records v. Briaas, 887 P.2d 864, 871 
(Utah App. 1994). In addition, the credibility of such evidence 
often turns on a party's demeanor which cannot be fairly judged in 
the absence of a trial. It is generally observed, therefore, that 
courts should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment 
when resolution of the dispositive issue necessitates a 
determination of one of the parties' state of mind. Credit Union 
of America v. Myers, 676 P.2d 99, 106 (Kan. 1984). 
C. Evidence of Reasonable Reliance and Damages. 
The remaining two points in defendant's argument on 
plaintiff's fraud claim essentially raise legal issues about the 
proper scope of this Court's opinion in Maack v. Resource Design 
and Construction Inc. , 875 P. 2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) and the proper 
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measure of damages. These points have been addressed in 
plaintiff's principal brief and need no repetition here. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF MISTAKE IS LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The remaining legal and evidentiary issues presented in 
defendant's argument on reformation of contract have also been 
addressed in plaintiff's principal brief. In addition, plaintiff's 
arguments on the standard of proof contained in Point I herein are 
equally applicable here. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has met its burden of producing evidence which is 
legally sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff's fraud and contract reformation claims. The 
summary judgment entered in favor of defendant on these claims 
should therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the trial 
court for resolution of the disputed issues of material fact. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
By:_G_ 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. 
J. Mark Gibb, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, # 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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